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A FIRST AMENDMENT BREACH:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
Caitlin Thistle ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 2005, journalists revealed that the U.S. government performed electronic surveillance on its citizens without a
1
warrant or any other prior judicial involvement. The government
initially justified the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance program (“NSA program”) with the asserted need for protection of national security, in light of the attacks on September 11,
2
2001. In response to increasing criticism of the program, President
George W. Bush relied on both executive authority in Article II of the
Constitution and the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use
3
of Military Force (AUMF) as authorization for these wartime meas4
ures. The revelation of the NSA program provoked reporters to
5
identify several problems with the administration’s program. Commentators argued that the program violated both the Foreign Intelli∗

J.D. 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2005, Colgate University. I
wish to thank Professor Azmy for all of his help and guidance during this whole writing process. I would also like to thank my parents, Peter and Susie, and my fiancé
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1
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
2
See Dan Eggen & Charles Lane, On Hill, Anger and Calls for Hearings Greet News of
Stateside Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at A1; Press Release, American Bar
Ass’n, Majority of Americans Say President Should Not Suspend Constitutional Freedoms without Court Order or Congressional Authorization (Feb. 10, 2006), available
at http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news021006.html.
3
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
4
Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research
Serv., Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to
Gather Foreign Intelligence Information 27, 30, 33 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Hope Yen, Probe Sought on NSA Surveillance; Members of Congress Question
Legality of Bush’s Authorization, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2005, at A5.
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gence Surveillance Act (FISA)—a statute that places limits on surveil6
lance of U.S. citizens for intelligence gathering purposes —and the
Fourth Amendment because of the government’s failure to obtain
7
warrants.
The courts are in tension as to whether the NSA program vio8
lates both the First and Fourth Amendments. There is arguably a
connection between the First and Fourth Amendments and the important role that both play in protecting U.S. citizens from invasions
9
of privacy, the type of intrusions that the NSA program perpetrates.
Legal commentators have not paid much attention to the additional
and independent First Amendment concerns with the NSA program
that were raised by the district court and the circuit court’s dissenting
opinion in ACLU v. NSA. This Comment seeks to address these concerns.
Congress proposed various amendments to FISA supposedly in
order to cure any question of the NSA program’s validity and to allow
for more flexibility in foreign intelligence surveillance. Various
members of the House and Senate proposed four separate bills, each
10
amending FISA in a different way. The motivation behind these
bills was to eliminate the warrant requirement under FISA and grant
the executive branch the power to engage in warrantless wiretapping
11
on U.S. citizens who place calls to foreign countries. Most recently,
the executive branch changed its position on the NSA program and
12
stated that any surveillance would be subject to FISA court approval.

6

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1862 (West
2003 & Supp. 2007).
7
Id.
8
See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775–76 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that
the NSA program violates both the First and Fourth Amendments), vacated, 493 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 2007). The government appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in a two to one split held that the particular plaintiffs do not have
standing to challenge the program on any claims, including the First Amendment.
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 673. The majority refused to rule on the legality of the program;
however, the dissenting opinion not only found that the plaintiffs had standing, but
also vehemently argued that the NSA program violated FISA and the Constitution.
Id. at 720 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
9
See infra Part III.
10
See S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3001, 109th
Cong. (2006); H.R. 585, 109th Cong. (2006); see also ACLU Comparison Chart of
NSA Legislation (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/ 26978leg
20060929.html [hereinafter ACLU Comparison Chart].
11
See Dan Eggen, Surveillance Bill Meets Resistance in Senate, WASH. POST, July 21,
2006, at A9.
12
Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Comm. on Judiciary, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Judi-
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This new decision is still a source of controversy because of the government’s failure to provide specific details about the program and
its overall delay in implementing these new procedures.
The legislative enactments and the asserted change of position
by the administration, however, would not obviate all of the constitutional infirmities of the NSA program. Even if the enactments remove any Fourth Amendment objections to the program, this Comment argues that the program independently violates the First
Amendment. Specifically, this Comment argues that the NSA program violates the First Amendment associational rights of individuals
subject to surveillance. Thus, the government must have a compelling state interest to excuse such a wholesale violation of constitutional rights. The government presumably justifies this violation of
First Amendment rights by invoking the all-encompassing interest of
national security, a justification this Comment argues is too broad in
itself. Moreover, the NSA program circumvents the Fourth Amendment, which often works to protect First Amendment rights, because
the government is neither obtaining a warrant nor satisfying FISA requirements.
This Comment seeks to unhinge the First Amendment analysis
from the Fourth Amendment inquiry typically used to analyze government surveillance programs. In order to protect First Amendment associational rights, a separate inquiry is required. The government must demonstrate that the NSA program has sufficient
procedural safeguards to be narrowly tailored to meet a genuine
compelling state interest. This Comment relies on ACLU v. NSA as an
example of how the government’s surveillance program violates the
First Amendment right of freedom of association and that, in order
to protect this interest, the First Amendment may require additional
procedural safeguards of its own.
Part II traces the history of FISA and government surveillance up
through the most recent NSA surveillance program. Part III discusses
FISA’s warrant requirement and demonstrates that this requirement
is essential to the Act’s constitutionality. This Part argues that the absence of a warrant requirement in the NSA program, examined in
the district court’s opinion in ACLU v. NSA, also raises serious independent First Amendment concerns. Part IV discusses the First
Amendment violation created by the NSA program, describing the
nature of the harm at issue as harm to freedom of association, which
requires a compelling state interest with the least restrictive means of
ciary (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20060117gonzales_Letter.pdf.
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invasion. Part V then discusses the idea of applying Fourth Amendment requirements to a First Amendment inquiry. It highlights the
concerns with this application, specifically discussed in Zurcher v. Stan13
14
ford Daily and Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. AT&T Co.,
and dismisses these concerns as not applicable to the NSA program.
Part VI proposes that the easiest way to satisfy the First Amendment is
to obtain a warrant and use Fourth Amendment procedures. However, if this is not possible, the First Amendment requires an independent inquiry of its own, essentially placing the requirement of
strict scrutiny ex ante as opposed to the current ex post examination.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
Historically, presidents justified the use of warrantless surveil15
lance as necessary for matters involving national security. Virtually
every president from Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt authorized some type of warrantless surveillance during wartime to intercept
16
Congress first attempted to
the conversations of suspected spies.
regulate electronic surveillance in 1968 through Title III of the Om17
Title III
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Title III”).
permitted law enforcement agents to use electronic surveillance only
if a reviewing judge found probable cause to believe the target “is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit” a particular enumerated offense, and that the surveillance would obtain incriminat18
ing communications about the offense. Even with this Act in place,
the executive enjoyed great discretion to undertake surveillance for
national security and virtually limitless power to engage in surveil19
lance for foreign security channels. Increasingly, scandals arose as
the executive continued to invoke surveillance under the guise of na-

13

436 U.S. 547 (1987).
593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15
Adam Burton, Fixing FISA for Long War: Regulating Warrantless Surveillance in the
Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 384 (2006).
16
Id. For example, President Lincoln authorized eavesdropping of telegraphed
messages in order to detect enemy plans during the Civil War. Id.
17
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801–803,
82 Stat. 197, 211–225 (1968) (Title III codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2000)).
18
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970).
19
Id. § 2511(3) (“Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States . . . .”).
14
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20

tional security. These suspect events began to tarnish the American
21
public’s belief in the truthfulness and legality of executive actions.
Aware of this growing concern, courts tried to limit the amount of
surveillance conducted, but the holdings did not extend beyond the
22
domestic context. Congress refused to regulate foreign intelligence
surveillance and instead “left presidential powers where it found
23
them.”
Even greater skepticism of the government’s limitless authority emerged during the Watergate scandal, prompting the creation of a special congressional committee—the Church Committee—
24
to investigate the issue.
In 1975 and 1976 the Church Committee published fourteen
reports on the U.S. intelligence agencies and their alleged deficiencies and proposed certain recommendations to address these con25
26
cerns. One of these recommendations was FISA and the Foreign
27
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which would oversee investigation of foreign suspects inside the United States. Congress approved FISA in 1978 with the goal of implementing a “secure frame28
work” by which the executive could obtain vital intelligence
information while still adhering to the nation’s goal of commitment
29
to privacy and individual rights.

20

Arthur S. Lowry, Note, Who’s Listening: Proposals for Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 70 VA. L. REV. 297, 311–13 (1984).
21
See id.
22
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protections extended to electronic surveillance but failing to extend
this holding to matters of national security); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith),
407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that the executive did not have the power to authorize
domestic electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval).
23
Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
24
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3908 (stating that abuses in electronic surveillance “were initially illuminated
in 1973 during the investigation of the Watergate break-in” and that further abuses
were shown by the Church Committee).
25
See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Church Committee Reports
(1976), http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm [hereinafter Church Committee Reports] (providing links to all fourteen reports).
26
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1862 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2007).
27
50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000).
28
ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916)).
29
Id.
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A. FISA Standards
FISA established the standards for obtaining a court order for
30
foreign intelligence surveillance. The FISC, initially seating seven
district court judges, grants court orders approving electronic surveil31
lance. In order for a federal officer to obtain authorization, the attorney general must certify the application after several criteria are
met. First, the application must state the “identity, if known, or a de32
scription of the specific target of the electronic surveillance.” Second, the officer must submit a statement of the reasons for his belief
that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power” and that the place at which the electronic
33
surveillance is directed is used by that target. Third, the application
must contain “a detailed description of the nature of the information
sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected
34
to the surveillance.” Last, the certifying official must state that he
believes the surveillance will obtain foreign intelligence informa35
tion.
After the official properly submits the application, the FISC will
grant an ex parte court order if the court deems that, on the basis of
the facts, “there is probable cause to believe that the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
36
power” and that the place where the surveillance is being directed is

30

50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir.
1984).
31
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000). The number has been amended numerous times.
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the court from seven to eleven judges and
required that at least three of the judges be from within twenty miles of the District
of Columbia. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. I 2001)).
32
50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
33
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (2000). FISA includes several definitions of “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power.” Most pertinent to this Comment, “FISA
defines ‘foreign power’ to include a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.’” Duggan, 743 F.2d at 69 (citing § 1801(a)(4)). “An
‘agent of a foreign power’ is defined to include both ‘any person other than a United
States person, who . . . acts in the United States as . . . a member of a foreign power . .
.’ and ‘any person who . . . knowingly engages in . . . international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power.’” Id.
(citing § 1801(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C)).
34
§ 1804(a)(6).
35
Id. § 1804(a)(7)(A).
36
Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (“[N]o United States person may be considered a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment . . . .”).
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37

used by that target. This standard is much less stringent than under
Title III, which required that a crime is being, had been, or would be
38
committed for surveillance to take place.
Even so, it may appear that FISA makes it difficult for the gov39
ernment to obtain a court order to conduct surveillance. This is not
the case at all; in fact, through the end of 2004, the FISC rejected
40
only five applications while granting 18,781 warrants. Also, even if
the government cannot obtain a warrant, there is an emergency procedure under FISA which authorizes the government to conduct sur41
veillance without a court order. FISC will grant the emergency order if the attorney general determines that immediate action is
42
needed with respect to electronic surveillance. The order is valid
43
for seventy-two hours before it must be reviewed by the court.
After September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT
44
Act to amend several portions of FISA. Two of the amendments to
FISA are relevant here because both enhanced the president’s ability
45
to collect foreign intelligence within the United States. The first
amendment lowered the surveillance standard. Previously, the col37

Id. § 1805(a)(5).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
39
See William Kristol & Gary Schmitt, Vital Presidential Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
2005, at A31.
40
See Federation of American Scientists, FISA Annual Reports Made to Congress,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/index.html#rept (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
In 2005 and 2004, none of the applications submitted by the government were denied. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep. (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http:// www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html; Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y
Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep. (Apr. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf. In 2003, four applications
were denied. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Ralph
Mecham, Dir. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf. In 2002, 2001, and 2000, all
applications were approved, and only a few were modified prior to approval. Letter
from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Ralph Mecham, Dir. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts
(Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2002rept.html;
Letter from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep.
(Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2001rept.html;
Letter from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Hon. Richard B. Cheney, Pres. Sen., (Apr.
27, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2000rept.html.
41
50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
42
Id.
43
50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4) (2000).
44
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
45
See Grayson A. Hoffman, Note, Litigating Terrorism: The New FISA Regime, the
Wall and the Fourth Amendment, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2003).
38
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lection of foreign intelligence information had to be the sole or primary purpose of the investigation; post-PATRIOT Act, it need only be a
46
significant purpose of the investigation. Second, the Act further expanded FISA to permit “roving wiretap” authority, which allows the
interception of any communication without specifying the particular
47
Altelephone line, computer, or other facility to be monitored.
though the amendments gave more power to the executive, FISA still
requires that the government meet all of its procedures and obtain a
48
court order before conducting foreign intelligence surveillance.
B. Warrantless Surveillance by the Government
Despite the high number of court orders granted by the FISC
and the emergency procedures already in place, the government still
engages in warrantless electronic surveillance on foreign agents
49
within the United States. The NSA implemented its program sometime after September 11, 2001, and it remained a secret until a New
50
York Times article revealed its existence.
The exact details of the
NSA program, labeled the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) by
51
the government, are unknown. Under this program, reauthorized
52
by President Bush over thirty times since 2001, the NSA intercepts
53
communications without a warrant or any form of court order. It
gathers information without the authorization of either the President
or the Attorney General, but instead uses its own discretion to find
probable cause that the target of the surveillance is associated with al
54
Qaeda. This program in no way complies with the procedures set
out by FISA; indeed, according to General Michael Hayden, thenPrincipal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, the NSA pro-

46

USA PATRIOT Act, § 218, 115 Stat. at 291.
Id. § 206, 115 Stat. at 282.
48
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
49
See e.g., Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1, at A1; see also President George W.
Bush, State of the Union Address at the U.S. Capitol (Jan. 31, 2006), (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html) [hereinafter 2006 State of the Union Address].
50
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1, at A1.
51
2006 State of the Union Address, supra note 50.
52
Bush Says He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN, Dec. 17, 2005, available at http://
www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa/.
53
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2,
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (information taken from plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts).
54
Id. at 2−3.
47
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gram, “is a more . . . ‘aggressive’ program than would be traditionally
55
available under FISA.”
The NSA claims that the program intercepts only international
communications and that the authority to do so is reviewed every
forty-five days by the General Counsel and the Inspector General of
56
the NSA. The NSA further explains that the program only intercepts those calls entering or leaving the United States that involve
57
someone associated with al Qaeda. Yet, despite the government’s
assurances, there is evidence to show that NSA surveillance is not tar58
geted at specific individuals.
Instead the NSA program uses data
mining to amass information mostly about the calls of ordinary
59
Americans who are not even suspected of a crime. The calling pat60
terns are then analyzed in order to detect terrorist activity. Despite
these allegations, the Department of Justice firmly assures the public
that it is not using the program to spy on innocent citizens but rather
61
to focus narrowly on international calls associated with al Qaeda.
The NSA claims that its power to engage in this kind of surveillance
stems from two sources: the September 18, 2001, AUMF authorizing
“all necessary and appropriate force” to engage in war with those re62
sponsible for the September 11 attacks; and Article II, Section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution, which, the administration argues, grants the
president inherent executive authority to take necessary measures to
63
protect national security during wartime.
C. Proposed Amendments and Compliance with FISA
Recently, members of Congress have proposed legislation to
change the scope of FISA to allow more flexibility in foreign intelli55

Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat’l Intelligence (Jan. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html.
56
Friends Committee on National Legislation, The White House Defines NSA
Myths vs. Realities (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.fcnl.org (follow “Civil Liberties” hyperlink under “Issues”; then follow “Privacy Issues” hyperlink; follow “The White
House Defines NSA Myths vs. Realities” hyperlink under “Resources”) [hereinafter
NSA Myths].
57
Id.
58
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at A1.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
NSA Myths, supra note 56.
62
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
63
Bazan & Elsea, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 33.
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gence surveillance. Each bill proposes different amendments to FISA
64
to deal with the president’s authority regarding the NSA program.
One recent bill presented by former Senate Majority Leader, William
Frist, titled the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, would change
many provisions of FISA, including a change that would allow warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international calls and e-mails
65
without any evidence of a relationship to al Qaeda. In addition, the
Wilson Bill proposed to change the definition of “electronic surveil66
lance” to authorize surveillance of Americans’ phone calls. The bill
specifically allows for the interception of communication either
“from the . . . United States to overseas, or from overseas to the
United States . . . without a court order so long as the government is
67
not intentionally targeting a known person in the U.S.” This bill
would “permit . . . vastly expanded government wiretapping of inno68
cent Americans without a warrant and without probable cause.”
Congress has not yet made any decisions regarding new legislation.
Even more recently, the Bush Administration announced its intention to comply with FISA when engaging in foreign surveillance.
A letter from then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, stated that the
President is committed to using lawful tools to protect the country
69
and to developing a new program with the approval of FISA. However, the Administration has not revealed details about the program
70
or its compliance, leading to the conclusion that the NSA program
64

S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3001, 109th
Cong. (2006); H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (2006); see also ACLU Comparison Chart, supra note 10.
65
S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006). This Bill would change FISA’s definition so that
the interception of calls and e-mails of American residents and businesses would no
longer need a warrant unless the sender and all of recipients are within the United
States. Id. at § 9(b).
66
Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. §2(b)
(2006).
67
Republican Vision of National Security: Republicans Move to Legalize Spying of Americans, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006, at A1 (citing Press Release, Rep. Louise M.
Slaughter, D-N.Y.). H.R. 5825 authorizes warrantless surveillance and searches of
Americans for ninety days. Id. H.R. 5825 allows for warrantless electronic surveillance and physical searches of Americans after an “armed attack,” a “terrorist attack,”
or in anticipation of an “imminent attack.” Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See Donna Leinwand, Court to Oversee Wiretap Program; Lack of Warrants Fed Controversy, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court Unchanged to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1;
Richard B. Schmitt, Greg Miller & David G. Savage, The Nation; Wiretap Review Plan Is
Still Unclear; Bush and Gonzales Say the Domestic Spying Is Essentially Except for Its Legal
Justification, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A12.
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remains the same. President Bush noted that “[n]othing has
changed in the program except the court has said we’ve analyzed it
71
and it’s a legitimate way to protect the country.” Because the administration failed to provide any specific information about the extent of its compliance with FISA, the administration’s decision—
leaving open the possibility that in fact nothing has changed—does
not affect the scope of this Comment. First, declining to address the
merits of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
ACLU v. NSA ruled only that plaintiffs lacked standing. This case is
on appeal to the Supreme Court and has yet to be ruled moot. Second, the debate still continues as to the exact role FISA is playing.
Last, at any moment the president may revoke the program and reimplement it without complying with FISA.
III. THE WARRANT AS A FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. FISA Does Not Violate the First Amendment Due to the
Warrant Requirement
Congress enacted FISA in order to curb the executive’s power
over surveillance and the invasion of both the First and Fourth
Amendments by creating a “secure framework by which the executive
branch [could] conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign
72
intelligence” while meeting Fourth Amendment requirements.
However, immediately after Congress enacted FISA, it was challenged
73
under the First Amendment.
74
In United States v. Falvey, defendants, all of Irish ancestry, were
accused of smuggling arms and equipment to the Irish Republican
75
Army.
The defendants argued that FISA violated their First
Amendment rights by allowing the government to use politically motivated surveillance of whatever group it chooses at a particular
76
time. The defendants claimed the surveillance would cause American sympathizers of these groups to be afraid to exercise their First
Amendment rights for fear that their privacy would be invaded by
71

Schmitt, Miller & Savage, supra note 70, at A12.
United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916); see
also S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908.
73
See John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Powers and
Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. FED. 385 (2003).
74
540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
75
Id. at 1307.
76
Id.
72
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77

FISA. The district court, rejecting this argument, held that FISA was
not overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment by creating a
chilling effect because of the specific protection in FISA that a war78
The court also found that the rerant be issued before a court.
quirement that a judge and not the executive make the finding that a
person is the agent of a foreign power before granting a warrant pre79
vents any abuse of political groups. FISA specifically states that no
person may be deemed an agent of a foreign power based solely on
80
Therefore, for the
activities protected by the First Amendment.
government to obtain a FISA warrant there must be more suspicion
81
than just a person’s association with a particular political group.
Based on these protections, the court held that FISA does not violate
82
the First Amendment.
B. The Lack of a Warrant in ACLU v. NSA
83

84

85

In ACLU v. NSA, the plaintiffs alleged that the NSA program
violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The program authorized government officials to intercept without obtaining a warrant the international telephone or Internet communications of a
86
number of persons and organizations within the United States. The
district court held that this program violated the Fourth Amend87
ment and, even more relevant for this Comment, the First Amend88
ment.
77

Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1315.
79
Id. at 1314.
80
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
81
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315.
82
Id.
83
438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
84
Under FISA, plaintiffs are defined as U.S. persons that have a rational belief
that they have been subjected to government interceptions. Id. at 758.
85
The government has termed the program the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(TSP). 2006 State of the Union Address, supra note 49. To prevent confusion, this
Comment does not use the term TSP, since persons outside the government generally do not use this terminology.
86
ALCU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
87
Id. at 775. The court held that the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment because the purpose of adopting the Fourth Amendment was to ensure that the Executive would not abuse its power to search, and thus searches outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable. Id. at 774–75 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)). Reasonableness, which is shown by asserting probable cause before a
neutral magistrate, is required in all Fourth Amendment searches. Id. at 775. The
TSP completely disregards any of these procedures set forth by FISA. Id.
88
Id. at 775−76.
78
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The district court found that the implementation of the NSA
program caused a chilling effect on First Amendment freedom of as89
sociation rights. The district court ruled that the NSA program violated the First Amendment based on the premise that the Bill of
Rights was created with the knowledge that “unrestricted power of
search and seizure could . . . be an instrument for stifling liberty of
90
expression.” The district court found that without prior judicial approval, electronic surveillance creates a chilling effect on free speech
91
and restricts one’s freedom of association. Based on this reasoning,
the district court held that the NSA program violated the First
Amendment by giving unrestricted authority to the president to conduct electronic surveillance and that the program did not meet the
First Amendment test of employing the least restrictive means to
92
achieve a compelling state interest.
The district court went on to explain that the NSA program created a chilling effect on First Amendment associational rights by ref93
94
erencing two cases.
First, in Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that repeated announcements by law
officers that an organization is subversive or is a communist front
95
frightened potential members and caused irreparable harm. Sec96
ond, in Zweibon v. Mitchell, the district court ruled that tapping an
organization’s office phone caused members to leave the organiza97
tion since their names would be associated with the organization.
The most important concept taken from both cases is that, according
to the district court in ACLU v. NSA, the only way that the government can engage in this kind of invasive surveillance is “upon a showing of a compelling governmental interest; and that the means chosen to further that interest are the least restrictive of freedom of
98
belief and association that could be chosen.”
The government appealed the case, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing;

89

Id. at 776.
Id. (citing Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724, 729 (1961)).
91
See id. at 776.
92
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
93
Id. at 776.
94
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
95
Id. at 488−89.
96
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
97
Id. at 634−35.
98
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
90
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thus, the court did not reach the merits of the case. The dissent
100
found that plaintiffs suffered an actual, concrete, and imminent
101
harm sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement. The dissent believed that the NSA program forces plaintiffs to abrogate their duty of
confidentiality under professional responsibility rules if they commu102
Further, the NSA pronicate with clients via e-mail or telephone.
gram does not comply with the “minimization procedures” under
103
FISA, which work to protect privileged communications between
attorney and client from interception or, if intercepted, from further
104
disclosure.
As explained in the dissenting opinion, the NSA program’s failure to comply with minimization procedures forces plaintiffs to travel internationally to meet with clients face to face and
cease telephone and email communications regarding sensitive sub105
The plaintiffs fear that communications
jects with overseas clients.
will be intercepted and potentially disclosed, breaching their attor106
ney-client privilege.
The NSA program does more than create a
subjective chill on speech; it also leaves plaintiffs with the dilemma of
choosing between breaching their duty of confidentiality to their cli107
The
ents and breaching their duty of effective representation.
plaintiffs’ fear of intercepted communications between themselves
and clients is reasonable and places a burden on their First Amend108
ment rights, which causes a concrete and imminent injury.
Further, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs have demonstrated
a causal connection between the injury complained of and the NSA
109
program.
The plaintiffs can no longer adequately perform their
110
If the NSA program did
jobs in part because of the NSA program.
99

ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 696 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 695 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (focusing on only the attorney plaintiffs
when discussing the issue of standing, stating that these particular plaintiffs have the
strong argument for an injury in fact).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 696–97.
103
Id. at 696. FISA’s minimization procedures require that a FISA application for
surveillance “must include a description of minimization procedures that will be utilized to protect privileged communications.” Id. These procedures must “‘minimize
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons.’” Id. (citing 50
U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)).
104
Id. at 695.
105
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 696 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
106
Id. at 697.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 704.
110
Id.
100
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not exist, plaintiffs would be protected by the minimization procedures set forth under FISA and would not have to cease telephone
111
and electronic communication with overseas clients. Lastly, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs’ injury is realized whether or not plain112
tiffs know that they are being subjected to government surveillance.
Plaintiffs owe ethical obligations to their clients regardless of whether
113
the communications with clients are actually being intercepted.
The plaintiffs have been injured professionally and personally because of the NSA program. They were unable to speak freely with
their clients, and thus their speech is chilled in violation of the First
Amendment.
The majority in ACLU v. NSA disagreed with the dissent’s analysis and instead dismissed the case for lack of standing and failed to
114
reach any discussion of the merits.
The Supreme Court previously
ruled that plaintiffs need only show the reasonableness of the fear
that leads the plaintiffs to respond in a way that may cause them some
115
However, the majority ignored this point and
harm or injury.
claimed that the plaintiffs may have suffered a subjective chill but not
a concrete, actual, or subjective injury to meet the standing require116
The majority found that since no plaintiff can demonstrate
ment.
that he or she has personally been subjected to surveillance, plaintiffs
117
are unable to meet the standing requirement.
The majority held
that even if it found any injury in fact that plaintiffs’ were unwilling to
contact their overseas clients due to fear that the NSA would inter118
The macept their communications, there was still no causation.
jority argued that the absence of the warrant is not the cause of this
fear, because even if a valid warrant were granted plaintiffs would not
119
In finding that plaintiffs lacked
necessarily know of the warrant.
standing, the majority does not even acknowledge the idea of minimization that is the crux of the dissent’s argument; it also fails to rec-

111

ACLU, 493 F.3d at 704 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 705.
113
Id. at 706.
114
Id. at 673 (majority opinion). The majority separately analyzed each of plaintiff’s six claims to determine if plaintiffs had standing on any claim. However, this
Part of the Comment focuses on the majority’s analysis of the standing requirement
for the First Amendment claims.
115
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
184 (2000); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987).
116
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 652–57.
117
Id. at 662.
118
Id. at 667.
119
Id. at 668.
112
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ognize the concrete injury that attorney plaintiffs suffer in not being
able to speak openly with their clients.
The district court’s decision and the court of appeals’s dissent in
ACLU v. NSA make plausible the argument that warrantless wiretapping violates the First Amendment, though it does not provide a fully
120
theorized account of the arguments.
This Comment attempts to
bolster this First Amendment claim by showing that national security
is not a compelling enough state interest to justify a violation of First
Amendment rights in this context. Even further, this Comment argues that if national security can be invoked as a compelling interest,
then the government nevertheless fails to use the least restrictive
means to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement. This Comment
proposes that a First Amendment claim needs an inquiry of its own,
separate and apart from the Fourth Amendment, in order to fully
protect First Amendment associational rights.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION
A. The History of First Amendment Freedom of Association:
Strict Scrutiny
The nature of the harm imposed by the NSA program is an in121
fringement on freedom of association.
When the government undertakes an action which inflicts an obvious injury on the individual
solely because of his lawful belief, “it has the direct and consequential
122
effect of chilling his rights to freedom of belief and association.”
Because of the great interest in not restricting First Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court has held that “such governmental actions
may be justified only upon a showing of a paramount or vital gov123
The government must meet this burden as
ernmental interest.”
well as demonstrate that the means chosen to further its compelling
interest are those least restrictive of freedom of belief and associa124
Strict scrutiny review is necessary because “when a [s]tate attion.
tempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations, its

120

The district court argument focuses on the Fourth Amendment violation, only
briefly mentioning the First Amendment violation. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754, 773−77 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The appellate court dissent discusses only briefly the
First Amendment violation and the merits of the case because the ultimate issue on
appeal was standing. ACLU, 439 F.3d at 660.
121
See supra notes 49−63, 83−108 and accompanying text.
122
Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
123
Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)).
124
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362−63.
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power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state
inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from ex125
ercising rights protected by the Constitution.”
First Amendment rights are often infringed upon in government
126
Disastrous effects can occur if there are abuses of
investigations.
the investigative process which reveal information “about a person’s
‘beliefs, expressions, or associations . . . concern[ing] matters that are
127
unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public.’”
The First Amendment protects the rights of all citizens to hold any
political belief and to belong to any lawful political party or associa128
tion. Strict scrutiny review is necessary even if a deterrent effect on
the exercise of First Amendment rights arises only as an unintended
129
result of the government’s conduct.
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of freedom of as130
sociation in NAACP v. Alabama, holding that the right protected the
NAACP from having to disclose the names of its members to state of131
ficials.
The Court believed that freedom of association was fundamental to First Amendment rights because effective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, especially controversial ones, is
132
greatly enhanced by group association. Thus, the Court recognized
the vital relationship between freedom of association and privacy in
133
The Court stated that investigations into the
one’s associations.
names of the group’s members “may induce members to withdraw . . .
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of
134
their beliefs . . . and of the consequences of this exposure.” There125

Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment prevented the State Bar from barring an applicant solely on his or her membership in a certain political organization).
126
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); see also Linda E. Fisher,
Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and Privacy of Groups, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 646–54 (2004).
127
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 38,
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (quoting
Watkins v. United States 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957)).
128
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356–57.
129
Id. at 362 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976)).
130
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
131
Id. at 466. The government claimed that it needed a list of the members of the
NAACP in order to determine if the organization was conducting intrastate business
in violation of an Alabama statute. Id. at 453. The Court held that the link was not
substantial enough to require production of the list. Id. at 458−60.
132
Id. at 460.
133
Id. at 462.
134
Id. at 463; see also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1978).
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fore, the Court held that due to the serious harm that can occur, the
135
government’s conduct is subject to strict scrutiny.
136
Clark v. Library of Congress demonstrates the type of harm that
can affect a member of an association. In Clark, the plaintiff brought
an action against his employer, the Library of Congress, for its inves137
tigation into his political beliefs and activities.
The FBI launched a
full-fledged investigation into the plaintiff’s activities after he attended several meetings of the Young Socialist Alliance, a group af138
filiated with the Socialist Workers Party. As a result of the investigation, family and friends specifically advised the plaintiff that he
139
The plaintiff not only suffered
should cease his political activities.
great mental anguish but was chilled in the exercise of his First
140
Amendment associational rights.
The court held that the Library
failed to demonstrate the existence of any legitimate or compelling
141
justification for investigating the plaintiff. The court stated that investigations of this manner are at times justifiable, but in this instance
the only basis for the investigation was minimal information regard142
This
ing the plaintiff’s association with a lawful political group.
case clearly shows that the government must present a compelling interest other than the fear that a person is associating with an unpopular political group.
143
Zweibon v. Mitchell further deals with the idea that unfettered
government surveillance can abridge one’s right to freedom of association. In Zweibon, the defendants, John Mitchell, then Attorney
135

NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–62; see also Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546. The Gibson Court
explained that:
[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which
intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech,
press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest. Absent such a relation between the N.A.A.C.P.
and conduct in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern, the Committee has not “demonstrated so cogent an interest in
obtaining and making public” the membership information sought to
be obtained as to “justify the substantial abridgment of associational
freedom which such disclosures will effect.”
Id. (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)) (emphasis added).
136
750 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137
Id. at 91–92.
138
Id. at 91.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 99.
142
Clark, 750 F.2d at 99.
143
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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General of the United States, and nine special agents or employees of
the FBI, installed wiretaps on telephones at the headquarters of the
144
The court
Jewish Defense League without prior judicial approval.
held that it was necessary to obtain a warrant before installing the
145
wiretaps.
The court stated that prior judicial review is essential in
order to protect the First Amendment rights of speech and association of those who might be chilled by the fear of unsupervised and
146
unlimited executive power to institute electronic surveillance.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v.
147
Dale ruled that certain associations may discriminate against and
exclude members. The Court held that the Boy Scouts, a private, notfor-profit organization, may exclude homosexuals because their conduct is inconsistent with the values that the Boy Scouts seek to instill
148
The Court further stressed the importance of the
in its members.
First Amendment right to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cul149
tural ends,” finding that, “[t]his right is crucial in preventing the
majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express
150
other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”
The Court’s decision acknowledges the importance of the independence of a group and that the
government should defer to the group to let it determine its mem151
Both Dale and NAACP emphasize selfbership and its message.
determination of groups in membership decisions and the right to
protection from outside invasion, ultimately creating a “strong asso152
ciational right, combining both expressive and privacy elements.”
This ability to associate without interference is one of the fundamen153
tal bases of the American democracy.

144

Id. at 605.
Id. at 614. The district court ruled that the Executive branch should determine whether electronic surveillance required a warrant because of a clear threat to
a country’s foreign relations. Id. at 607. The appellate court disagreed, holding that
even if the surveillance was for foreign intelligence gathering and national security
purposes, a warrant was still needed. Id. at 614.
146
Id. at 634–35.
147
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
148
Id. at 644.
149
Id. at 647 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
150
Id. at 647−48.
151
See Fisher, supra note 126, at 641.
152
Id. at 641–42.
153
Id. at 642.
145
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B. Injury in Fact
Government surveillance can pose numerous harms to individual persons and groups as well as one’s freedom to associate with that
group. The most obvious harm is that surveillance will hurt the reputation of a particular group and, even worse, chill members’ voices
within the group, ultimately weakening the group’s ability to express
154
itself. The group may also be a target of surveillance because of an
expressed political or religious view which is considered to be “extremist,” therefore rendering a member unable to state his or her be155
This political profiling
liefs for fear of governmental intervention.
creates broad sweeping surveillance and diverts the attention of law
156
enforcement officials away from legitimate investigations.
Investigations of individuals tied to a suspect group may have the effect of
157
distorting the group’s identity and message.
Lastly, surveillance of
a religious group’s rituals and other expressive activities undermines
the independence of a person’s need to be free from the constraints
158
of an all-conforming society.
Specifically, the NSA program causes harm due to the lack of judicial oversight prior to surveillance. This lack of judicial oversight
allows the government to surveil specific persons or groups that it believes are agents of a foreign power or affiliated with a terrorist or159
ganization.
Surveillance of groups who the government believes
might have any contact with persons the government suspects—
perhaps even incorrectly—to be connected to terrorism will create a
chilling effect and impinge upon one’s freedom of association.
These people will not be able to associate with the group they choose
160
due to the prospect of warrantless wiretapping by the government.
Under the government’s plan, the NSA can initiate surveillance on
anyone for an unspecified duration, just because the supervisor be161
This is a
lieves that the person is associated with a terrorist group.
clear invasion of First Amendment rights, and the government does
154

George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 53−54
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
155
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM.
L. 295, 299–300 (2002).
156
Fisher, supra note 126, at 652.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
See supra notes 58–63.
160
See supra Part II.B.
161
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d. 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204).

THISTLE_FINAL

2008]

6/12/2008 12:07:22 PM

COMMENT

1217

have a compelling interest or that the program uses the least restrictive means of invasion.
A central issue in ACLU v. NSA was whether plaintiffs, who did
not know whether they were under surveillance, could demonstrate
162
concrete “injury in fact” necessary to demonstrate standing.
The
district court held that the NSA program caused a concrete harm,
163
which enabled the plaintiffs to satisfy the standing requirement.
The court of appeals, in a two to one split, reversed this decision,
164
finding plaintiffs lacked standing.
However, this Comment focuses
on the district court’s argument that these plaintiffs can demonstrate
standing and that plaintiffs in the future may also demonstrate standing. A basic understanding of the rationale for finding that plaintiffs
have standing is necessary to illustrate the limited class of plaintiffs
who can invoke the First Amendment under the argument proposed
by this Comment. In ACLU v. NSA, the plaintiffs were a group of
prominent journalists, scholars, attorneys, and non-profit organizations who frequently communicated by telephone to the Middle East
165
Some of these plaintiffs, based on the nature of their
and Asia.
work, communicated with groups and individuals the U.S. govern166
The
ment believed to be associated with terrorist organizations.
plaintiffs, most specifically attorneys, suffered a concrete harm because they were unable to communicate with those individuals in
connection with their work or, if they did communicate, ran the risk
167
that the attorney-client privilege would be breached. Based on this
reasoning, the plaintiffs were able to make a plausible argument that
they could establish standing.
Clearly, this Comment is not meant to imply that any citizen can
argue that his or her speech is chilled based on the fear of investiga-

162

438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Id. at 770. The issue of standing arises in any case involving freedom of association and a subjective chill of speech. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that a plaintiff does not have standing based on a mere belief that his speech has
been chilled not by a specific action against them but by the existence and operation
of a system designed to gather and distribute intelligence).
164
ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007).
165
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4,
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204).
166
Id. at 4.
167
Id. at 4–6. The program has limited the ability of a professor to gain information about sensitive matters, a journalist to gain information because of the fear that
names will not remain anonymous, and an attorney to properly assist clients by not
allowing contact with key witnesses. Id. at 5–6. The program also creates financial
costs to all of these plaintiffs because they are unable to communicate over the telephone and so must travel far distances in order to acquire vital information. Id. at 6.
163
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tion; rather, the citizen must be in a situation similar to the plaintiffs
in ACLU v. NSA and show an objective, concrete harm. This Comment assumes that only those plaintiffs who can establish standing
can argue that the NSA program violates their First Amendment associational rights.
C. Compelling State Interest or Narrow Tailoring?
It is clear that to justify a First Amendment violation the gov168
ernment must have a compelling state interest. The government is
attempting to justify the NSA program on the compelling interest of
national security. However, the state interest of investigating terrorism and preventing future attacks cannot exist in a situation where
169
evidence of criminal behavior is lacking.
Mere suspicion of a particular group and political profiling cannot justify an intrusion into
170
that group’s activities and membership. Danger to political dissent
is heightened “where the Government attempts to act under so vague
171
a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security.’” It is so difficult to define national security that the risk of abuse is apparent. Allowing the executive branch to make its own decisions with regard to
the needs of national security invites abuse of First Amendment
rights, and public knowledge of this abuse can ultimately thwart the
172
goal of national security.
This is exactly the type of abuse that the
government hoped to prevent by enacting FISA to stop a century of
173
Therefore, the guise of national sesuspect presidential authority.
curity is no longer a legitimate enough interest to allow the executive
to engage in warrantless surveillance of the American people.
Due to the fear that has affected the American people since September 11, 2001, national security is a more compelling interest. Yet,
even if this interest is recognized by a court, the government needs to
further justify the wholesale violation of First Amendment rights by
the NSA program. The government must meet the exacting scrutiny
requirement by showing that the means of invasion are least intrusive.
Here, the requirement of narrow tailoring is in no way met by the
government. The NSA program allows eavesdropping on any Ameri-

168

See supra Part IV.A.
Fisher, supra note 126, at 662.
170
Id.
171
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S 297, 314 (1972).
172
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at
37–38, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (citing Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 635−36 (1975)).
173
See supra notes 25−29 and accompanying text.
169
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can who is believed to be linked to a terrorist group.
Further, the
NSA program is suspected of using data mining to collect information about calls made by Americans who are not suspected of any
175
Exactly who the NSA program is spying on is unclear, but
crime.
regardless, there are no safeguards in place to determine whether the
particular target has engaged in an action to justify the surveillance.
Thus, the NSA program violates both the compelling state interest
and the narrow tailoring requirement. However, because there may
be a time when this interest is compelling enough and when the government narrows the scope of the program, it is necessary to address
other First Amendment safeguards that may need to be put in place
in foreign surveillance inquiries. Part V of this Comment discusses
the link between the First and Fourth Amendments and shows that
the First Amendment needs its own independent inquiry, especially
in light of the all-encompassing interest of national security.
V. THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS:
APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS
TO FIRST AMENDMENT INQUIRIES
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
176
of grievances.” The Fourth Amendment states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 177

Although stopping physical entry into the home was the chief
reason behind the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, its broader
178
spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance. It
is apparent that the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect First
Amendment rights and that without proper Fourth Amendment
compliance, First Amendment values are left vulnerable. In national
174

See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204).
175
See supra Part II.B.
176
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
177
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
178
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967); Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41
(1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S 505 (1961).
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security cases there is a “convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
179
values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”
A. “Scrupulous Exactitude” in Applying the Fourth Amendment
In United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), the Court held that
Fourth Amendment protections are especially necessary when the
targets of surveillance are those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
180
The concept of protecting domestic security was
political beliefs.
so vague and there was such great difficulty in defining the domestic
security interests that the Court believed dangers of abuse quite ap181
The Court stated that American citizens should not be
parent.
forced to curb their private discussions about the government based
182
on the fear of unauthorized governmental eavesdropping.
Yet the
Court recognized that the government also has a great interest in
protecting national security that must be weighed against the danger
183
that unreasonable surveillance will place on freedom of expression.
Therefore according to Justice Douglas’s concurrence, in order to
properly address both interests, a warrant should be issued by a neutral magistrate and not be left to the sole discretion of the executive
184
branch. The Court rejected the government’s arguments that a requirement of prior judicial approval would impinge upon its ability to
obtain intelligence and determined that, although there may be
some burden on the attorney general in determining when a warrant
should be granted, this use of a warrant is justified in order to protect
185
constitutional values.

179

United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S 297, 313 (1972) (addressing
the question of the President’s power to authorize electronic surveillance in internal
security matters without any prior judicial approval). The Court held that despite
government concerns, a departure from Fourth Amendment requirements of prior
judicial approval was not justified in that instance. Id. at 321. The Court limited the
scope of the decision to the specific aspect of national security, not extending the
holding to foreign powers or their agents. Id. at 321−22.
180
Id. at 313−14.
181
Id. at 314.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 314–15.
184
Keith, 407 U.S. at 325. (Douglas J., concurring). Douglas joined the majority
opinion; however, his concurrence gave a more in-depth analysis of the First
Amendment implications in Fourth Amendment inquiries.
185
Id. at 320−21. The government argued that requirement of prior judicial approval would hurt domestic security because the internal security matters are too
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation and the element of secrecy would be lost.
Id.
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Although Keith was specifically limited to domestic security mat186
ters, it sufficiently laid out the argument that the First and Fourth
Amendments are linked and that, especially in the context of surveillance for national security matters, in the absence of prior judicial in187
There are
volvement one’s First Amendment rights are vulnerable
numerous other cases that show the importance of creating safe188
guards when First Amendment rights are at stake.
When the government seeks to seize materials which may be protected by the First
Amendment, the court issuing a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must apply the warrant requirements with “scrupulous exacti189
“The commands of our First Amendment” teach that it is
tude.”
necessary to “safeguard[] not only privacy and protection against selfincrimination but ‘conscience and human dignity and freedom of
190
Clearly, there is an extreme emphasis on the
expression as well.’”
great need for precision when applying the Fourth Amendment to
First Amendment inquiries.
Two other cases also reinforce the idea that there needs to be
judicial oversight in First Amendment analyses. First, in Freedman v.
191
Maryland, the Supreme Court reviewed a statute that proscribed the
showing of a motion picture without first obtaining a license from the
192
Maryland State Board.
The Court held that this license requirement violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expres193
In making this assessment, the Court determined that there
sion.
was a lack of adequate safeguards to protect expression, reiterating
that only a judicial determination ensures the necessary sensitivity to
194
In the second case, A Quantity of Books v.
freedom of expression.
195
Kansas, the Court addressed a Kansas statute that authorized the
seizure of allegedly obscene books before a determination of their
186

Id. at 321–22.
Id.
188
See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S 496 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S 51 (1965); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S 476 (1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964).
189
Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485 (invalidating a warrant which authorized the search of
a private home for books and materials relating to the Communist party and holding
that the warrant must specifically list what is to be seized because of the delicate nature of First Amendment rights).
190
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
191
Freedman, 380 U.S. 51.
192
Id. at 52 & n.1.
193
Id. at 60–61.
194
Id.
195
378 U.S. 205 (1964).
187
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196

obscenity.
The Court found that this statute presented the danger
of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unob197
structed circulation of nonobscene books. Both of these cases show
that a prior judicial determination needs to be made when First
198
Amendment rights are at stake.
Yet the question still remains
whether Fourth Amendment requirements can provide protection
adequate to ensure that First Amendment rights are properly vindicated or whether a separate First Amendment inquiry is required.
B. Zurcher and Its Implications for the First Amendment
Since both the Fourth and First Amendments are inextricably
bound together, few courts have addressed the issue of whether the
First Amendment needs additional safeguards aside from those already provided by the Fourth Amendment. Yet, this question is of
great importance when the government initiates warrantless surveillance for national security matters. It is especially important in situations, such as those present in ALCU v. NSA, where the government
circumvents the Fourth Amendment requirement and even more
important in situations where the Fourth Amendment is not asserted
as an objection to the government’s action.
199
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Supreme Court examined the
question of whether the First Amendment required independent
safeguards and found that there are no additional procedural safeguards needed to protect First Amendment rights if the Fourth
200
Amendment is satisfied.
In Zurcher, a student newspaper brought
suit, alleging that a police search had violated its First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights because the scope of the warrant was
overly broad and a newspaper’s headquarters should not be the sub201
ject of an innocent third-party search due to the confidential in196

Id. at 206–07. The warrant authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of the
books, and the there was no hearing on the question of obscenity. Id. at 207−08.
The Court found these procedures insufficient because they did not adequately safeguard against the suppression of nonobscene books. Id. at 207–08.
197
Id. at 208.
198
See id. at 212; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60–61.
199
436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Police Department, after responding to a call to remove demonstrators, was forced to use drastic measures to calm people down. Id. at
550. The Stanford Daily, a student newspaper, published photos alongside an article
the next day. Id. at 551. The police secured a warrant to search the newspaper office
for the photos, on the basis that the photos might help to identify the assailants. Id.
200
Id. at 565−67.
201
Id. at 551–52. The newspaper published an article about a violent protest at a
hospital, containing articles and photographs of the event. Id. at 551. There was “no
allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were in any way involved in
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202

formation that it possesses.
The district court held that where a
newspaper is the subject of a third-party search, First Amendment interests require that a search is permissible only “in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that 1) important materials will
be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining
203
This standard would place a precondition
order would be futile.”
on the issuance of a warrant beyond just the requirement of probable
204
205
cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an
innocent third-party search was justified where the newspaper was not
the subject of a criminal investigation but materials obtained might
206
aid in the investigation.
The Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, finding that “[n]either the Fourth Amendment nor
the cases requiring consideration of First Amendment values in issuing search warrants . . . call for imposing the regime ordered by the
207
District Court.” The Court explained that by subjecting searches to
a test of reasonableness and the requirement of the issuance of warrants by a neutral magistrate, First Amendment values are fully pro208
The Court posited that “[t]here is no reason to believe”
tected.
that a neutral magistrate could not guard against unreasonable
searches, and if the magistrate follows “the requirements of specificity
209
and reasonableness” for a warrant then no harm should occur.
Zurcher ultimately stands for the proposition that when First
Amendment values are at stake, the Fourth Amendment, when properly applied, can adequately protect these values and no further safe210
guards are needed.
Yet ACLU v. NSA shows that perhaps Zurcher
needs to be reexamined in light of the NSA program, which does not
comply with the Fourth Amendment requirement and independently
violates the right of freedom of association. Some concerns arise in
the context of creating an independent First Amendment inquiry.

unlawful acts at the hospital”; therefore, it was considered to be an innocent third
party. Id.
202
Id. at 551–52.
203
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
204
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565.
205
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1977).
206
Zurcher, 436 U.S at 550.
207
Id. at 565.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 566.
210
Id. at 565−67.
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C. The D.C. Circuit’s Concerns About Heightened First
Amendment Standards
211

In Reports Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., Judge
Wilkey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussed the
convergence of the First and Fourth Amendments and the consequences of affording more procedural safeguards to protect First
212
Amendment rights. The court attempted to answer the question of
whether the First Amendment affords plaintiffs extra “privacy by imposing substantive or procedural limitations on good faith criminal
investigat[ions] . . . beyond the limitations imposed by the Fourth
213
and Fifth Amendments.”
The plaintiffs, a group of journalists,
brought suit against two telephone companies, claiming that they
were entitled to prior notice before their long-distance billing records
214
The court held that extra
were released to government officials.
procedural safeguards are not necessary in the context of First
215
Amendment investigations. Judge Wilkey stated that
the guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments achieve their
purpose and provide every individual with sufficient protection
against good faith investigative action for the full enjoyment of his
First Amendment rights of expression. To the extent an individual insists that he must shield himself from the prospect of good
faith investigation and operate in secrecy in order to exercise effectively particular First Amendment liberties, he must find that
shield and establish that secrecy within the framework of Fourth and
216
Fifth Amendment protections.

The court ruled that individuals who “desire to exercise their First
Amendment rights” must operate in “the zone of privacy secured by
217
the Fourth Amendment.”
The court reasoned that “[w]hen individuals expose their activities to third parties, they similarly expose
218
these activities to possible Government scrutiny.”

211

593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
Id. at 1053.
213
Id. at 1054.
214
Id. at 1036. Telephone companies, including the defendants in Reporters Committee, have a practice of releasing long distance calls when they are the subject of a
government investigation, but only after a valid subpoena or summons is issued and
notification is given to the caller, unless it would impede the investigation. Id. at
1036–38.
215
Id. at 1058–59.
216
Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
217
Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1058.
218
Id.
212
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In making the argument for no further First Amendment safeguards, Reporters Committee was concerned with newspapers and other
media sources trying to immunize themselves from good faith inves219
tigation.
The court stressed that problems would arise because of
the necessity of separating journalists, reporters, and a limitless number of people from others, essentially making a decision that some
220
The
individuals’ First Amendment rights are greater than others.
court believed that the law enforcement officers in each case would
need to delineate the individuals and species of activity entitled to
protection and that this additional requirement would place a great
221
burden on law enforcement activities. Lastly, since all investigation
is somewhat linked to the First Amendment, the court determined
that it was extremely difficult and time consuming to separate those
222
cases that involve First Amendment values and those that do not.
At one point, both the concerns suggested by Judge Wilkey and
the holding in Zurcher were well received; however, it is now necessary
223
to reexamine both approaches in light of ACLU v. NSA.
Based on
ACLU, it is apparent that the NSA program is harming a certain class
of plaintiffs subjected to warrantless surveillance. The Fourth
Amendment is not protecting these plaintiffs and other citizens unaware of the surveillance. It is necessary to address the First Amendment violations of the NSA program to show that adequate safeguards are not in place and that an independent inquiry is required.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Passing First Amendment Scrutiny: The Warrant
The only way that the government can legitimately interfere with
the freedom of association is to show a compelling state interest in
the investigation and that the means chosen to achieve that interest
224
Since the government kept the NSA proare the least restrictive.
gram a secret, it is difficult to tell exactly who the targets of the surveillance are and how the government determines that that person is
a foreign agent or a terrorist. The government argues that it implemented the program based on a genuine compelling state interest
and that the program is the least restrictive of First Amendment
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
See supra Part III.B.
See ALCU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 758, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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225

rights. The government denies that the program engages in broad
226
sweeping surveillance of all Americans.
Regardless of the target of the surveillance, the government still
needs to show a compelling interest in invading the right to freedom
of association. The government has a great interest in preventing
terrorism, especially after the attacks of 2001. Investigations are useful in gathering intelligence data for national security, and the lack of
227
intelligence was a major cause of the September 11 attacks.
Yet intelligence needs to be limited to and focused on areas that will be the
228
most likely to yield information about terrorists.
To state the obvious, simply because a group is engaged in non-mainstream political
or religious activity does not prove that the group is involved in a
229
crime or, for that matter, that it is likely to do so. The government
cannot engage in sweeping surveillance under the justification that
every person may be linked to a terrorist cell. This would be pointless, but even worse, it would violate the First Amendment, since even
with this current threat there is no justification for complete defer230
ence to the executive branch with respect to associational rights.
The government must meet exacting scrutiny, showing a compelling
interest with the least restrictive means to justify this invasion.
The easiest way for the government to show that it has a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored is to obtain a warrant. This
would show an interest more particularized than national security in
the abstract and prove that the government is not engaging in sweeping surveillance. By complying with the procedures set out by FISA
for obtaining a warrant, the government would allow the court to
make a prior judicial determination that the surveillance is reasonable and that the government has met all of the FISA criteria. If the
government’s interest is legitimate, it will almost always be able to se231
Also, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court
cure a warrant.
has already determined that because of the warrant requirement,

225

NSA Myths, supra note 56.
Id.
227
Deborah Solomon, Questions for Tom Kean: Want to Know a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan 4, 2004, at 9. (“[T]here is a good chance that 9/11 could have been prevented by any number of people along the way. Everybody pretty well agrees our intelligence agencies were not set up to deal with domestic terrorism.”).
228
Fisher, supra note 126, at 657.
229
See Adam Liptak, The Nation: Prisons to Mosques; Hate Speech and the American
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at 3.
230
See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775−76 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
231
See supra Part II.A.
226
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FISA does not violate one’s freedom of association.
A warrant
would clearly satisfy this narrow tailoring requirement because the
use of prior judicial adjudication is exactly what the Supreme Court
contemplated as adequate First Amendment protection—that is, that
the Fourth Amendment needs to be applied with “scrupulous exacti233
tude.”
By obtaining a warrant, the government would show exactly who
is a target of the surveillance and that there is a reasonable belief that
the target is a threat to national security or a member of a foreign
group suspected of engaging in terrorism. The government will most
likely argue that obtaining a warrant is too burdensome and restricts
the type of surveillance that is necessary in order to protect national
234
However, Keith, though admittedly in the domestic consecurity.
text, weighed both the privacy interests of citizens and the national
security interest of the government and determined that in order to
properly address both interests a warrant should be issued by a neutral magistrate instead of giving the executive the sole discretion in
235
the realm of surveillance.
This same reasoning holds true in the
context of foreign surveillance—the competing interests must be balanced and the most rational way to ensure that both interests are protected is to require a warrant.
B. Other Potential Safeguards
Although obtaining a warrant appears to be the simplest way to
resolve the problem of foreign surveillance and protection of free236
dom of association, the government appears to believe otherwise.
If the government’s belief becomes a reality, freedom of association
may not be properly protected. If the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement is not properly applied or is somehow bypassed, then
First Amendment values are left vulnerable. The First Amendment
relies heavily on Fourth Amendment protections. Although the First
Amendment requires a compelling state interest and narrow tailor237
ing, this whole inquiry can sometimes be forgone under the guise

232

See supra Part III.B.
See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S 476, 485 (1965); see also A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
234
See NSA Myths, supra note 56. “The NSA program is an ‘early warning system’”
and is “a program with a military nature that requires speed and agility.” Id.
235
See supra notes 180−90 and accompanying text.
236
See supra Part II.C (proposed amendments to FISA would do away with the requirement of a warrant).
237
See supra Part IV.A.
233
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238

of national security.
Therefore, when the Fourth Amendment is
not providing adequate protections, or when the government is simply avoiding it, the First Amendment needs some separate inquiry of
its own in order to protect independent associational values. This
analysis will become necessary if the government can show that the
warrant requirement is too burdensome or that somehow the NSA
program still satisfies the Fourth Amendment, even without a warrant. Furthermore, this Comment proposes that these safeguards
apply only to situations similar to ACLU v. NSA and national security
surveillance, not to all First Amendment inquiries.
239
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co. raised
concerns that prevented the court from recognizing First Amendment rights independent of the Fourth Amendment. These concerns
would not exist in the context of NSA surveillance as demonstrated
by ACLU v. NSA. The first concern that newspapers will try to immu240
nize themselves from all surveillance is not related to foreign surveillance and is therefore easily dismissed. The second concern of
Reporters Committee, that all investigation is linked to the First Amend241
ment, can also be dismissed in this instance. This Comment proposes that more First Amendment safeguards are necessary only in
the context of the NSA program. Therefore, this would limit the
concern that all investigation is related to the First Amendment and
thus subjected to more safeguards, since this heightened inquiry
would apply only to the NSA program. Thus the example of ACLU v.
NSA can justify the argument that a separate First Amendment inquiry is necessary, showing that the twenty-eight-year-old Reporters
Committee holding needs to be revised in light of the changing nature
242
of surveillance and the limitless invasion of privacy.
Another reason Zurcher and the concerns expressed in Reporters
Committee should not apply in the NSA surveillance context is that in
243
both of these instances some sort of warrant was issued. In ACLU v.
244
NSA, there was no warrant issued, which allowed the government to
instead engage in any type of surveillance that it deemed in the best
245
This is easily distinguishable from
interest of national security.
238

See supra Part IV.A.
593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
240
Id. at 1060.
241
Id. at 1059.
242
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775–76 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
243
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 551 (1978); Reporters Comm., 593
F.2d at 1040.
244
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
245
See id.
239
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Zurcher, in which a warrant was issued based on probable cause.
The initial safeguard of a warrant is not even in place under the NSA
program. In the NSA program it is impossible to determine if the investigation is conducted in good faith because no warrant is issued—a
judge never oversees any aspect of the surveillance.
This Comment does not propose total elimination of surveillance because that would defeat the purpose of investigation in the
first place, but rather tries to ensure a sound reason for subjecting a
particular person or group to surveillance. Based on the needs for
protection, this Comment proposes that the First Amendment requires a separate inquiry, independent of the Fourth Amendment in
the area of surveillance for national security measures. The easiest
way to safeguard First Amendment interests is to heighten the requirements of the test already in place, which calls for a compelling
government interest and the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest. Instead of reviewing surveillance under the strict scrutiny
standard to determine whether an individual’s freedom of association
has been violated in a post hoc manner, strict scrutiny review should
be applied prior to allowing the surveillance. Normally, if one believes that his freedom of association has been infringed upon, he
must go to court to force the government to show that the government surveillance can survive strict scrutiny review. However, strict
scrutiny review should be applied prior to the invasion of associational rights. Before the government can engage in surveillance, it
should present evidence to show that it has a compelling state interest and that the means used to achieve that interest are the least intrusive. The easiest way to meet this standard is to obtain a warrant,
which will almost automatically satisfy both prongs of the test. However, if the government chooses not to engage in the supposed burden of obtaining a warrant, it can submit a document that describes
why the surveillance is necessary and the potential targets of the surveillance before a committee, or perhaps even a separate branch of
the FISA court. This branch would produce a much quicker turnaround than the warrant procedure because this specific committee
would only review these particular applications. This requirement
would need to be compelled by a statute in order to force the government to comply. This suggested standard of review applies a
Fourth Amendment standard to a First Amendment inquiry, even
when a Fourth Amendment challenge is not at issue. This standard
would apply only to the unique situation presented in ACLU v. NSA,

246

436 U.S at 551.
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and would not extend to other types of surveillance or other First
Amendment issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is apparent after the decision in ACLU v. NSA, and the revelation of the President’s secret wiretapping program, that American
citizens’ First Amendment rights are being violated. The President’s
illegal encroachment into citizens’ privacy is not a new problem;
however, the implementation of FISA supposedly brought an end to
the century-long problem. Yet the NSA program is not only bypassing FISA and the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement before
engaging in this surveillance, it is completely ignoring First Amendment associational rights.
First, it is clear that there is a First Amendment violation. The
particular plaintiffs are being harmed in their freedom to associate
with groups and ultimately are chilled from engaging in their work
and various other aspects of their lives. The government does not
present a compelling interest other than national security, which may
be too broad to adequately protect Americans. Even further, if the
compelling interest is accepted, the NSA program fails the narrow tailoring requirement of First Amendment heightened scrutiny. The
First Amendment requirement becomes even greater in matters of
national security. Therefore, there is an apparent constitutional violation that needs to be addressed.
This Comment brings to light the fact that when Fourth
Amendment protections are pushed aside, First Amendment rights
are left with little protection of their own. Although in Zurcher and
Reporters Committee, the courts rejected the argument that First
Amendment rights receive more protection, these cases need to be
reexamined in light of the NSA program. The concerns suggested in
both cases are not present in the context of the NSA program. This
Comment is limited to this particular situation and does not address
the broad issue of government surveillance for all national security
matters.
Based on the First Amendment failings, this Comment proposes
first that the government can meet both prongs of exacting scrutiny
by obtaining a warrant. This would ensure that the governmental interest of national security is narrowly tailored and only those persons
who are truly foreign agents and for whom there is probable cause to
target are under surveillance. However, if the government does not
feel it can comply with the warrant requirement, then it is necessary
that the First Amendment be detached from the Fourth Amendment
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and have an independent inquiry of its own. This procedure would
essentially take the strict scrutiny standard and apply it ex ante as opposed to ex post, thus ensuring that First Amendment rights are not
violated and that the government is not engaging in widespread warrantless wiretapping. This approach would curb many of the executive’s illegal activities, meet the Executive’s concerns for national security, and honor First Amendment association rights.

